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Chelsea Zou

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2 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

CalBench: Evaluating Coordination-Privacy Trade-offs in Multi-Agent LLMs

We introduce CalBench, a controlled evaluation environment for studying multi-agent coordination through calendar scheduling. In CalBench, N agents each manage a private calendar containing pre-existing commitments and must coordinate to schedule a stream of M incoming meetings while minimizing disruption costs. Because agents observe only their own calendars, successful scheduling requires communication across private information boundaries. Each scenario is generated with an oracle solution, enabling precise measurement of coordination quality via realized-to-optimal cost, as well as a Distributed Constraint Optimization (DCOP) baseline to provide a fair comparison under the same private-information constraints. CalBench enables precise verification of task success, communication efficiency, and fairness in the distribution of disruption costs. Our environment also studies privacy-preserving coordination by augmenting calendar entries with private semantic contexts of varying sensitivity and measuring whether agents reveal task-irrelevant private information during negotiation. Unlike multi-agent benchmarks where a single capable agent can often substitute for the group, CalBench is inherently decentralized: no agent has access to another agent's private calendar, yet agents must still reach mutually consistent decisions over shared meeting scheduling. CalBench therefore provides a practical and verifiable setting for studying coordination protocols, communication efficiency, negotiation strategies, fairness, and privacy leakage in multi-agent systems.

preprint2026arXiv

Talk is Cheap, Communication is Hard: Dynamic Grounding Failures and Repair in Multi-Agent Negotiation

Grounding is the collaborative process of establishing mutual belief sufficient for a communicative goal. While static grounding maps language to a shared context, dynamic grounding requires agents to negotiate meaning across turns. Current multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) benchmarks largely emphasize static, one-shot tasks, overlooking whether agents can repair grounding breakdowns through interaction. We introduce an iterated multi-turn negotiation game where two agents allocate shared resources to private projects with verifiable jointly optimal outcomes. Although individual agents can identify Pareto-optimal allocations in isolation, agent dyads consistently fail to reach them across models. We identify four failure modes: (1) loss of shared interaction history, (2) stubborn anchoring to early proposals, (3) defaulting to equal splits over reward-maximizing coordination, and (4) referential binding errors across turns. Our baselines show that the coordination gap is not explained by individual reasoning limits or insufficient information exchange alone. Instead, the bottleneck lies in dynamic grounding: joint plan formation, commitment, and execution.