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Alice Gao

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2 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Training Computer Use Agents to Assess the Usability of Graphical User Interfaces

Usability testing with experts and potential users can assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and user satisfaction of graphical user interfaces (GUIs) but doing so remains a costly and time-intensive process. Prior work has used computer use agents (CUAs) and other generative agents that can simulate user interactions and preference, but we show that agents still struggle to provide accurate usability assessments. In this work, we present a novel machine learning method that operationalizes a computational definition of usability to train CUAs to assess GUI usability by i) prioritizing important interaction flows, ii) executing them through human-like interactions, and iii) predicting a learned numerical usability score. We train a computer use agent, uxCUA, with our algorithm on a large-scale dataset of fully interactive user interfaces (UIs) paired with usability labels and human preferences. We show that uxCUA outperforms larger models in accurate usability assessments and produces realistic critiques of both synthetic and real UIs. More broadly, our work aims to build a principled, data-driven foundation for automated usability assessment in HCI.

preprint2016arXiv

Incentivizing Evaluation via Limited Access to Ground Truth: Peer-Prediction Makes Things Worse

In many settings, an effective way of evaluating objects of interest is to collect evaluations from dispersed individuals and to aggregate these evaluations together. Some examples are categorizing online content and evaluating student assignments via peer grading. For this data science problem, one challenge is to motivate participants to conduct such evaluations carefully and to report them honestly, particularly when doing so is costly. Existing approaches, notably peer-prediction mechanisms, can incentivize truth telling in equilibrium. However, they also give rise to equilibria in which agents do not pay the costs required to evaluate accurately, and hence fail to elicit useful information. We show that this problem is unavoidable whenever agents are able to coordinate using low-cost signals about the items being evaluated (e.g., text labels or pictures). We then consider ways of circumventing this problem by comparing agents' reports to ground truth, which is available in practice when there exist trusted evaluators---such as teaching assistants in the peer grading scenario---who can perform a limited number of unbiased (but noisy) evaluations. Of course, when such ground truth is available, a simpler approach is also possible: rewarding each agent based on agreement with ground truth with some probability, and unconditionally rewarding the agent otherwise. Surprisingly, we show that the simpler mechanism achieves stronger incentive guarantees given less access to ground truth than a large set of peer-prediction mechanisms.