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Alec Wolman

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2 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Switchcraft: AI Model Router for Agentic Tool Calling

Agentic AI systems that invoke external tools are powerful but costly, leading developers to default to large models and overspend inference budgets. Model routing can mitigate this, but existing routers are designed for chat completion rather than tool use. We present Switchcraft, the first (to the best of our knowledge) model router optimized for agentic tool calling. Switchcraft operates inline, selecting the lowest-cost model subject to correctness. We construct an evaluation framework on five function-calling benchmarks and train a DistilBERT-based classifier, deployed under a latency budget. Switchcraft achieves 82.9% accuracy -- matching or exceeding the best individual model -- while reducing inference cost by 84%, saving over $3,600 per million queries. We find that larger models do not consistently outperform smaller ones on tool-use tasks, and that nominally cheaper models can incur higher total cost due to token-intensive reasoning. Our work enables cost-aware agentic AI deployment without sacrificing correctness.

preprint2020arXiv

Are We Susceptible to Rowhammer? An End-to-End Methodology for Cloud Providers

Cloud providers are concerned that Rowhammer poses a potentially critical threat to their servers, yet today they lack a systematic way to test whether the DRAM used in their servers is vulnerable to Rowhammer attacks. This paper presents an end-to-end methodology to determine if cloud servers are susceptible to these attacks. With our methodology, a cloud provider can construct worst-case testing conditions for DRAM. We apply our methodology to three classes of servers from a major cloud provider. Our findings show that none of the CPU instruction sequences used in prior work to mount Rowhammer attacks create worst-case DRAM testing conditions. To address this limitation, we develop an instruction sequence that leverages microarchitectural side-effects to ``hammer'' DRAM at a near-optimal rate on modern Intel Skylake and Cascade Lake platforms. We also design a DDR4 fault injector that can reverse engineer row adjacency for any DDR4 DIMM. When applied to our cloud provider's DIMMs, we find that DRAM rows do not always follow a linear map.